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ABSTRACT
This study attempts to reconcile divergent results between two previous 
studies of CR/price affects for supermarkets. A more complete data set from 
Kaufman and Handy is used in an earlier model by Marion et al. to determine if 
the differences are attributable to (1) model specifications, (2) interim structural 
change or (3) role of leading firm compared to all firms. The first two 
comparisons were indeterminate but the third provides some support for the 
CR/price hypothesis compared to the size economy/service explanations. While 
not conclusive, these results argue for caution in rejecting SMSA supermarket 
concentration as an influence over prices.
SUPERMARKET PRICES REDUX
Of all the studies done by agricultural economists, perhaps the most 
controversial have been evaluations of the impacts of food store market structure 
on performance, especially prices. Indeed, one such study achieved the notoriety 
of a scathing Wall Street Journal editorial.
That study (Marion et al. 1979) had found a strong positive relationship 
between market dominance at the SMSA level, as measured by four firm 
concentration ratios and relative firm market share, and both firm profits and 
prices. Such findings are not uncommon in the literature, dating back to before 
the National Commission on Food Marketing in 1966. Indeed, since 1960, over a 
dozen major studies of food store performance have been completed1 and only 
three, Gorman and Mori (1966), Grinnell et al. (1976), and Kaufman and Handy 
(1989), have reported insignificant and negative relationships between structural 
variables and retail food prices. The earlier studies can be faulted for using 
simple correlation techniques and/or inappropriate CPI data or other notable 
limitations, but the Kaufman and Handy study presents a more complex matter to 
reconcile with the body of earlier work.
A reconciliation is especially important because, in a detailed literature 
review, Anderson (1990, p. 77) concludes:
"Our review of the studies of grocery prices showed that all of the studies suffer 
from a failure to control adequately for services and quality differences among local 
retailing markets. ... The finding that prices are higher in more-highly concentrated
-^Studies not otherwise cited include Lamm (1981,1982), Cotterill (1983, 1984, 1986), Hall et. al. (1976), FTC 
(1960), Mueller and Garoian (1961), Padberg (1992) also reviews prior to 1960.
markets may rather reflect higher costs or higher quality and more services in more 
concentrated markets. The study that does the best job of dealing with these problems -  
[Kaufman and Handy 1989] -- finds that prices are not higher in more concentrated 
markets."
Padberg raises a similar question in terms of the "regularities" or 
"generalizability" of industrial organization (10) studies. Thus he is searching 
for what Schmalensee and Willig (1989, p. 1000) refer to as "empirical 
regularities" and Weiss (1971, p. 363) identifies as the "set of generalizations." 
This is no easy matter in studies which differ over time and in methodologies and 
data sources assembled with none of the natural scientist s regard for replication. 
And as Padberg notes, there is little theoretical basis for hypothesizing the 
observed relationships in retail markets as opposed to the "theory of one price" for 
commodities.
The purpose of this article is to explore the generalizability issue in more 
depth by examining further the two most detailed yet controversial studies, 
Marion et al. representing the classical 10 methodology, and Kaufman and 
Handy the new thinking, cost-based approach. Attention is on price/structure (as 
opposed to proflt/structure) analysis because results are less sensitive to store 
size-related costs although, as Anderson (1990, pp. 28-29) points out, adjustments 
must still be made for input cost, service and quality differences.
The methodology employed here is essentially to re-estimate the Marion et 
al. model using Kaufman and Handy data. In this way the discrepancy in the 
results can be attributed to either (a) model specifications or (b) variable 
measurement/data sources. Our re-evaluation indicates that market 
power/market structure cannot be dismissed as a causal component in local food
pricing.
Study Summaries of Marion et al. and Kaufman and Handy
M arion et al.: Marion and his co-authors were commissioned by the Joint 
Economic Committee (JEC), giving them subpoena rights for data collection not 
available from public sources and leading to a more detailed study than typical. 
Considering only price analysis, the model used is (1979, p. 429):
C = ft) + PiRFMS + P2CR4 + P3SS + P4MG + p5MSZ + p6MR + P7WG + e
Where:
RFMS = Relative Firm Market Share (MSj/CR^), a measure of the market power of the ith firm. Pi>0.
CR4 = Four Firm Concentration, a measure of market power of the four largest firms in an SMSA.
P2>0.
SS = Mean store size by SMSA, in sales dollars, an adjustment for the importance of supermarkets. 
p3<0.
MG = Market Growth, 1967-74 % growth in SMSA deflated grocery store sales, a measure of ease of 
entry or greater capacity utilization. p4 *■ 0.
MSZ = Market Size, 1974 SMSA size measured by grocery store sales, accounts for very large SMSAs 
which constitute multiple submarkets. p5 *  0.
MR = Market Rivalry, 11972CR4_1974CR4 I, greater change indicates a more competitive 
environment. p6<0.
WG = Wages, weighted average of 1974 union wages for meat cutters, clerks and checkers, a measure 
of market-specific costs. p7>0.
C (dependent variable) = Weighted Market Basket Cost, national and private label product prices for 
94 items for October 1974 for three large chains in 32 SMSA's.
The results for the "best" (highest R^) model are shown in Table 1, Column 
1. These support the researchers' expectations, especially regarding the signs 
and magnitudes of the market structure variables, which are interpreted to show
the existence and use of market power. Other variants of the model give similar 
results. The analysis is, however, in Anderson's (1990) assessment, limited by the 
single market-specific cost differential (WG) and absence of quality/service 
measures. The dependent variable can also be criticized for the limited scope of 
the market basket which, by allowing only frozen food, dairy and grocery items, 
excludes 50% of expenditures in supermarkets. Moreover, the included items 
were not systematically chosen for representativeness.2
Kaufman and Handy: This study was undertaken to correct for the 
shortcomings of earlier studies (1989, pp. 2-3). Special emphasis was put on the 
collection of food prices which ultimately involved a random selection of 28 
SMSA's stratified by concentration levels. Within each SMSA, one or more 
supermarkets were randomly selected from the six leading firms, with an 
additional five randomly selected firms representing all other supermarkets. 
Random selection allowed the choice of multiple stores from the same firm within 
a SMSA. Items were selected from all food departments and soaps/toiletries. 
Procedures were used to standardize product quality and compensate for missing 
items. In total, prices were selected from 616 supermarkets in 321 firms over 
three "waves", February, April and May 1982 (1989, pp. 4-7 and Appendixes). The 
following model was analyzed in log linear form:
PI = Po + PlMS + p2H4 + (33SALES*SIZE + p4FI + P5OCCST + P6SERV + p7WAGE + P8WARESTR +
P9MR + P10MT + PuMG + P12ME + e
Where:
MS = Market Share, firm market share by SMSA. A market power as well as a firm size economy 
measure. Pi ^ q.
2The data in fact are drawn from store-initiated price comparisons. Marion et al. 1979, p. 421.
H4 = Pour firm partial Herfindahl. P2 * 0.
SALES*SIZE = Sales times Size, a store level size economy measure. P2<0.
FI = Firm Integration, a binary (1= with warehouse) proxy for multistore economies. p3<0.
OCCST = Occupancy Cost, index of rental rates and utility costs as a proxy for cost differences within 
and between SMSA's. p5>0.
SERV = store services, index of services (eg., deli department). Ps>0.
WG = Labor Compensation, average hourly wage bill per employee. Do to different competitive 
conditions, P7 * 0.
WARESTR = Warehouse Store, binary variable (l=with) indicating firm has low price and service 
warehouse store in SMSA. Pg<0.
MR = Market Rivalry, sum of MS changes of six leading firms 1979-81, an indication of competition. 
P9<0.
MT = Market Turbulence, subjective binary measure. P i0 < 0 -
MG = Market Growth, real food sales growth by SMSA, 1977-81. With short term fixed capacity, 
growth allows price increases. Pn>0.
ME = Market Entry, sum of 1982 MS of leading firms entering a SMSA 1977-81, where high entry is 
expected to increase competition. P i2 < 0 -
PI (dependent variable) = Price Indexes, firm level price indexes by SMSA, data collected as described 
above (1989, pp. 8-9 and Appendixes).
The results are shown in Table 1, Column 2. As the market power 
measures (MS and H4) are both negative and statistically insignificant at
standard levels while efficiency factors (sales*size) and service measures (SERV) 
have the expected signs and are significant, the authors conclude that "... 
oligopolistic firm market power did not play a significant price determining role." 
(1989, pp. 29-30). While not without its faults, Anderson found this study more 
complete than Marion et al.'s and the dependent variable measured more 
systematically, leading to his conclusion that market power is not implicated in
supermarket firm pricing decisions.
Table 1: Results o f Marion et aL and Kaufman and Handy Studies
1 2
Variables Marion et. al. Kaufman and Handv3
RFMS 6.426 (2.932)
c r 4 16.545 (5.256)
ss -.006 (-3.070)
MSZ -.082 (-4.169)
MR -.501 (-5.154) -.016 (-2.130)
WG .666 (.662) -.002 (- .184)
MS -.003 (-1.174)
h 4 -.008 (-1.574)
Sales*Size -.015 (-5.184)
FI -.001 (-.81)
OCCST .055 (3.233)
SERV .045 (3.874)
WARESTR -.059 (-4.695)
MT -.005 (-.682)
MG .381 (3.716)
ME .002(2.731)
R2 .70 .35
N 39 321
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.
Sources: Marion et al. 1979, Table 3, equation If; Kaufman and Handy 1989, Table 10
^MG coefficient in K-H corrected according to 3/90 errata letter from Kaufman..
Evaluation
While it is tempting to accept Anderson's assessment, it is important to 
consider the numerous differences between the two studies other than in 
variables and the efficiency/service measures. Here we investigate three factors: 
(1) model differences, (2) changes in industry structure over the intervening 
period, and (3) leading firm role. The approach used is to re-estimate the 
relationships using the Kaufman and Handy data4 (K-H).
Variable Measurement: The two studies did not use identically defined 
variables, leading to the possibility that model differences caused the contrary 
results. To test that possibility, the original Marion et al. (M) model was rerun 
using the K-H data, and in more complete form with services and occupancy costs 
added. The results (Table 2, Columns 1 and 2) do not differ appreciably from the 
K-H results, suggesting that small differences in variable definitions are 
unimportant.
Structural Changes: While only eight years elapsed between the data 
collection for the two studies, they were years of major innovation in 
supermarkets. In particular, the period marked the rise of warehouse stores from 
250 in 1976 to 1800 in 1982 and superstores (1982 sales > $8 M) from 750 to 3400 over 
the same period (Prog. Grocer 1983, p.8). This change is especially important 
because M assert as supermarkets "...set the competitive tone in most markets, 
and compete only indirectly with smaller grocery stores, concentration in the 
supermarket sector is a better indicator of market power conditions than 
concentration within all grocery stores" (1979, p. 423). The increase in larger 
stores over the eight year period suggests a greater concentration within
4 Dr. Handy generously provided a copy of the data set on diskette. As a first step, the reported results were
replicated.
supermarkets which, if the M hypothesis is correct, should indicate stronger 
market power effects. This possibility was tested by partitioning the K-H data set 
and analyzing only the supermarket and larger subset (n=269). The results, 
shown in Table 2, Column 3, show no notable statistical differences from the full 
sample (Table 1, Column 2). This result is not unsuspected because supermarkets 
dominate the sample (84%) so that this approach is not a real test of the M 
hypothesis of the role of supermarkets. Indeed, with the position of supermarkets 
now so dominant in grocery sales in communities of any size, the issue may be 
mooted.
A further partitioning of the data set into superstores only was attempted 
(Table 2, Column 4) (n=96 or 30%). This subsample of the largest stores in the 
most rapidly growing class effectively focuses on a different hypothesis, the one of 
size economies. If, in fact, large stores are more efficient, then the sales*size 
variable, the size economy proxy, should be negative and significant, which it is 
weakly. Regrettably, this variable is a poor proxy for size economies, especially as 
the National Commission on Food Marketing determined back in the mid-1960's 
that utilization is far more important to unit costs than is size itself (1966, Chap. 
7). Alternatively, the market power variables remain insignificant so that there is 
no support for the M type hypothesis.
The results have several other changes from the base case which are 
difficult to explain and complicate the interpretation. For example, occupancy 
costs are negative and insignificant (opposite the hypothesized case) while labor 
costs are both positive and significant. Store services are insignificant (at the 5% 
level, one tailed test), but that is likely because all stores of this size have the full 
set of available services. Additionally, market growth and rivalry are 
insignificant, a change from previous results. Clearly the competitive dynamics
for these very large operations are not well understood, but size economies are, at 
most, but one of the aspects.
Anderson (1990, p. 40) raises the possibility that concentration, store size 
and service levels all tend to be correlated, leading to a spurious relationship 
between prices and concentration. While there is no evidence for that relationship 
in the K-H sample (correlation coefficient r=.12 for H4 and SERV), it is not clear 
how a strong relationship would be interpreted. Anderson (1990, p. 36) describes 
several service enhancements like better product selection and double coupons 
use as a competitive tactic. Yet Marion and the NC117 Committee (1985, p. 297) 
characterize them as forms of non-price competition, which is more likely to arise 
in mature markets dominated by a few firms. Thus, whether more services 
leading to higher prices can be described as a cost-for-service factor or as an 
indirect consequence of non-price competition cannot be resolved from this data 
set.
Leading Firm Role: The M and K-H models actually test quite different 
hypotheses. By selecting the sample within SMSA's to include firms with a range 
of market shares, the K-H tests emphasize the impact of MS and CR on w ithin  
SMSA price levels rather than betw een SMSA's. That is, their 321 observations 
represent only 28 SMSA’s so that most of the explanatory power is for within 
SMSA differences. This may also explain why K-H found firm-specific 
cost/service variables to have such statistical significance. In contrast, M chose 
leading firms and investigated their exercise of market power across SMSA's. 
Since it can be argued that the impact of market power is best reflected in the 
between market actions of leading firms, or in Weiss' (1971, p. 365) words, the 
hypothesis "does not refer to fringe firms," it is important to evaluate the leading 
firm segment of the K-H data set. As shown in Table 2, Column 5, there are 
indeed important differences, most notably that a market share variable (RFMS)
does have the positive sign and statistical significance (at about the 6.5% level, one­
tailed test) associated with the exercise of market power.5 The other major 
differences from the base model (Column 2) are the reduced significance for MG, 
MR, SERV and WARESTR. The results for SERV are likely attributable to the low 
variability among the large, leading stores. These factors suggest that the leading 
firms are somewhat isolated from market dynamics, which of course is one of the 
attributes (and goals) of market power. Thus market power may exist among the 
market leaders, where it affects the bulk of shoppers.
Table 2: Variants o f  the Kaufman and Handy Model
1 2 3 4 5
Variable M Model/K-H M Model Enhanced/ K-H Model K-H Model M Model/K-H
Data K-H Data- Supermarket Superstores Data-Leading Firms
subset subset subset
RFMS -.009 -.008 .060
(4.71) (3.33) (1.61)
c r 4 -.031 -.023 -.006
(2.12) (1.67) (.15)
MS -.003 -.005
(1.39) (1.21)
h 4 -.005 .002
(1.00) (.23)
Sales*Size -.01 -.01
5 Anderson (1990, pp. 60-61) criticizes the use of RFMS. It is included here rather than MS to enable a direct 
comparison between the results of the M and K-H studies. However, because of the additional variables used 
by K-H, some of Anderson's criticisms of M do not apply to the Table 2 results.
(4.38) (1.49)
Sales/sqft -.006 -.013 -.02
(.72) (1.78) (1.08)
MG .28 .32 .22 -.13 .31
(3.01) (2.90) (2.19) (.87) (1.07)
MSZ .002 -.004 .015
(.39) (.75) (1.00)
MR -.002 -.019 -.016 .007 .017
(.21) (1.69) (2.24) (.62) (.55)
SERV .033 .058 .027 .005
(2.70) (4.75) (1.40) (.09)
OCCST .056 .278 -.031 -.02
(3.04) (1.64) (1.16) (.36)
MT -.006 -.017 -.019 -.04
(.72) (2.31) (1.93) (1.46)
FI -.002 -.004 .0004 -.06
(.28) (.52) (.03) (.93)
WARESTR -.063 -.059 -.066 .008
(4.72) (4.76) (3.53) (.23)
ME .002 .002 .002 .001
(2.63) (2.75) (1.97) (.61)
WG -.0005 -.009 -.006 .03 .056
(.05) (.86) (.64) (1.94) (1.09)
R2 13 30 36 34 55
N 310 310 269 96 27
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.
Denver observations are omitted because the market size variable was unavailable.
Conclusions
This article compares two conflicting studies of retail food prices, one which 
concludes that market power has a strong positive effect on prices (Marion et al. 
1979) and one which finds that efficiency and service level differences are the 
causal factors, not market power (Kaufman and Handy 1989). This comparison is 
important for the industry under study as well as the broader debate in industrial 
organization over the role of market power vs. service and efficiency. A 
decomposition of the more complete K-H data set leads to different conclusions. 
While the specific form of the equations is not of great consequence, the 
aggregation of store types by K-H masks competitive differences among store 
formats. Perhaps more important, an analysis using only leading firms indicates 
that market power as measured by share does indeed influence pricing. Thus the 
new thinkers in industrial organization need to reflect more carefully before 
discrediting the substantial early work showing positive structure-performance 
relationships.
How general are these results for food prices? That is difficult to say, for 
there are period-specific aspects of the data which cannot be separated from the 
results. In particular, the Marion et al. study was conducted during a period of 
high food price inflation and a price freeze.6 The profitability of supermarket 
chains during inflationary periods suggests that they benefit when prices are 
rising. Perhaps that is why Marion et al. got such strong market power results. 
But the K-H results relate to a more stable period that cannot be so easily ignored. 
Relevence to the 1990's is another question. In the intervening period there have 
been numerous changes in the industry of which slotting allowances and 
increased use of computers for shopping pattern analysis and shelf inventory
6 The food CPI in 1974 rose lay 14.3% compared to 4.1% in 1982. Statistical Abst. 1984.
control are but two. The relationships of these factors to store/firm size and 
market concentration have not yet been explained.
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